The hidden identity of faces. A case of lifelong prosopagnosia by Wegrzyn, Martin et al.
CASE REPORT Open Access
The hidden identity of faces: a case of
lifelong prosopagnosia
Martin Wegrzyn1* , Annika Garlichs1, Richard W. K. Heß1, Friedrich G. Woermann2 and Kirsten Labudda1
Abstract
Background: Not being able to recognize a person’s face is a highly debilitating condition from which people with
developmental prosopagnosia (DP) suffer their entire life. Here we describe the case of J, a 30 year old woman who
reports being unable to recognize her parents, her husband, or herself in the mirror.
Case presentation: We set out to assess the severity of J’s prosopagnosia using tests with unfamiliar as well as
familiar faces and investigated whether impaired configural processing explains her deficit. To assess the specificity of
the impairment, we tested J’s performance when evaluating emotions, intentions, and the attractiveness and likability
of faces. Detailed testing revealed typical brain activity patterns for faces and normal object recognition skills, and no
evidence of any brain injury. However, compared to a group of matched controls, J showed severe deficits in learning
new faces, and in recognizing familiar faces when only inner features were available. Her recognition of uncropped
faces with blurred features was within the normal range, indicating preserved configural processing when peripheral
features are available. J was also unimpaired when evaluating intentions and emotions in faces. In line with healthy
controls, J rated more average faces as more attractive. However, she was the only one to rate them as less likable,
indicating a preference for more distinctive and easier to recognize faces.
Conclusions: Taken together, the results illustrate both the severity and the specificity of DP in a single case. While
DP is a heterogeneous disorder, an inability to integrate the inner features of the face into a whole might be the best
explanation for the difficulties many individuals with prosopagnosia experience.
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Background
J is a 30 year old woman who approached our research de-
partment and asked to be examined for possible prosopag-
nosia. According to her self-report, J has a lifelong inability
to recognize the identity of others from their faces. This in-
cludes an inability to recognize her parents, her husband,
and (under certain conditions) herself in the mirror.
The first case of prosopagnosia present from early child-
hood, now called developmental prosopagnosia (DP), was
described by McConachie in 1976 [1]. Unlike the proso-
pagnosia cases reported before [2, 3], McConachie’s
patient showed no signs of brain damage that could
explain the condition. It took 20 years until a second case
of DP was reported [4], and hence the condition was con-
sidered to be very rare. However, with increased awareness
of prosopagnosia in public, more people reporting
symptoms of “face blindness” have come forward [5].
Today it is estimated that around 2% of the general popu-
lation presents with DP [6, 7]. Similar to other people with
lifelong prosopagnosia [8, 9], J reports that she was oblivi-
ous to the nature of her condition for the vast majority of
her life. “It simply never occurred to me that one could
recognize people only by their face”, J told us. A few years
ago she was watching a TV talk show, in which one of the
guests was interviewed about his prosopagnosia. J de-
scribes this moment as the one in which she immediately
knew that she must have the same condition.
Because a researcher on the show was looking for par-
ticipants to enroll in a study concerned with hereditary
forms of prosopagnosia (cf. [10, 11]), J asked her family
members whether they had the same problem as her. No
one in J’s family identified with the symptoms she
described, which makes it likely that J has a non-hereditary
form of the condition [12, 13]. Therefore, J could not enroll
in the study advertised on television and instead visited
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neurologists and neuropsychologists, who in turn were
unable to diagnose her with prosopagnosia, as neither
diagnostic criteria [14, 15] nor test instruments [7] are so
far clinically established.
However, some hallmarks of DP have been agreed
upon in the research literature: The main deficit is an in-
ability to recognize individuals by their faces, but pre-
served ability to recognize them by non-face information
such as voice, gait or clothes [16]. The onset of the con-
dition is at least in early childhood, and the deficits are
sustained throughout life [17]. Furthermore, there is no
evidence for acquired brain damage that could explain
the symptoms [18].
Regarding the age of onset, J reports that she cannot
remember a time when she was able to recognize people
by their faces and recalls conspicuous behavior she
showed as far back as grade school. Back then, she
would spend most of her time in the schoolyard with
her best friend, who would constantly have to tell her
the names of classmates they passed on the schoolyard,
and point out people they knew. J told us that back then
she did not suspect she was somehow impaired, but ra-
ther thought that her friend was simply exceptionally
good at recognizing people. Also, it was not obvious to J
what information her friend was using to recognize
people. It did not occur to her that it was their faces
which gave away other people’s identities.
Previous to visiting our lab, J had two clinical MRIs
which were diagnosed as asymptomatic. This diagnosis
was confirmed by our own MRIs, which do not show
any abnormalities on a macroanatomical scale, including
the fusiform gyri (Fig. 1a). Areas in the lateral part of
the fusiform gyrus are important for face processing [19]
and these are the areas damaged in the acquired forms
of prosopagnosia [20] However, they have been shown
to be intact even in severe cases of DP [21–24].
To characterize both the specificity and the severity of
J’s self-reported difficulties with faces, we asked her to
perform a number of different tests. These were de-
signed to delineate deficits restricted to recognizing the
identity of faces from more global deficits in processing
non-identity information in faces and other objects. Fur-
thermore, tests with different degrees of difficulty were
used and J’s performance was compared relative to
matched healthy controls or to normative data, when-
ever feasible. Finally, to better understand the possible
cognitive mechanisms which underlie DP, we designed
experiments which allowed us to evaluate how success-
fully J uses different face processing strategies, such as
configural processing [25], where information in the face
needs to be integrated into a whole.
Case presentation
Object recognition and ventral stream functions
DP is a condition of varying specificity and particularly
the early cases were impaired in more general object
recognition as well [1, 4]. Later, very “pure” cases, re-
stricted to deficits in recognizing only the identity of
faces were reported [23, 26, 27]. To exclude a more gen-
eral form of agnosia, we performed a screening with
living as well as non-living objects (cf. methods section), on
which J made no mistakes. In two fMRI tasks with faces,
hands and landscapes as stimuli, J showed prototypical ac-
tivity in the lateral fusiform gyrus for faces (Fig. 1 b, c) and
Fig. 1 Results of structural and functional brain imaging. a inferior view of the cortical surface reconstructed from high-resolution structural MRI,
depicting that the fusiform gyri show no sign of being abnormal; b results for the “faces vs. landscapes” fMRI localizer task; c results from the
“faces vs. hands” fMRI localizer task. fMRI results are shown on the inflated cortical surface, with face activity shown in warm colors and activity for
the respective control condition shown in cool colors. Results are thresholded at t = 3. For both paradigms, strong bilateral activity can be seen
for the face condition, in the lateral parts of the fusiform gyri. The anterior clusters in the fusiform gyri most likely correspond to the “fusiform
face area” and the posterior clusters in the lateral occipital cortex most likely correspond to the “occipital face area”. Unthresholded normalized
surface maps are available online: https://neurovault.org/collections/4017/
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activity in medial parts of the ventral stream for landscapes
(Fig. 1b). These are the patterns which are predicted by the
standard models of object processing [19] and indicate that
J’s abilities to differentiate between faces and non-face
objects are unimpaired. Such normal activation patterns in
the fusiform gyrus for faces, lateral to the mid-fusiform sul-
cus [28], have been reported in previous cases with DP
[29–31]. However, from discussions with J we learned that
faces as a superordinate category might pose a challenge
for her when forming or accessing internal representations.
For example, she often retains vivid recollections of her
dreams, but they do not feature faces: “Whenever there is a
person, instead of the face there is just a placeholder of some
kind”. When reading fiction, J claims that she always im-
agines the actions of the people described from a
first-person perspective, which obviates imagining what the
person performing that action might look like. Deficits in
imagery for faces have also been found in some previous
studies on DP [32, 33].
Furthermore, J complained to us about problems with
body perception, specifically correctly identifying her left
and right hand. While J is unequivocally right handed
according to the Edinburgh handedness questionnaire
[34], she claims that she often uses the “wrong” (i.e. left)
hand when initiating a movement and then has to cor-
rect herself and switch hands. In patients with damage
to the fusiform gyrus, similar problems with body
perception have been reported [35]. Accordingly, J’s
performance on the Bergen Right-Left Discrimination
Test [36] was two standard deviations below average (cf.
Table 1), while her performance on a more general
visuo-spatial task (subtests six to eight of the LPS-2; [37])
was poor but still within the normal range (percentile 16).
This might indicate that some body-specific visuo-spatial
functions, which are neuroanatomically located close to
the primary face processing areas, can also be impaired in
certain cases of DP.
Recognition of unfamiliar faces
J reports that her condition is especially impairing when
she has to learn new faces, as was the case when she
held a job in sales and distribution: “If you have a job
where you sit in your office and people come to you at
previously appointed times, it is easy. But if you have to
actively approach people, go to their offices, or make
small talk in the hallway, you can’t do it if you don’t
know who is who”. Her inability to recognize customers
and colleagues therefore had many repercussions, even
leading to the loss of some jobs.
To test J’s ability to learn and recognize new faces, we
used the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT; [38]),
which is the most established test in DP research, and is
considered most promising as a clinical diagnostic in-
strument [18, 39]. It hides hair and other external fea-
tures in the pictures and does not show faces
simultaneously but consecutively, so feature matching is
not as easily possible [38]. In the first part of the test,
one face is shown for 2 s and after a brief pause 3 faces
appear, the learned face being one of them. In this part, J
scored a perfect 100% correct when trying to recognize
the learned face (Fig. 2). Afterwards, she explained to us
that for each face she tried to find one or two character-
istic features, verbalize them for herself and then search
for them in subsequent pictures (e.g. “elongated chin”,
“fair eyes”, “chubby cheeks”).
In the next two parts of the CFMT, six faces are pre-
sented simultaneously for 20 s to study and then have to
be recognized in subsequent arrangements of 3 faces, of
Table 1 Overview of J’s performance for all major tasks
Domain Test % correct percentile z t df p
Face recognition CFMT 1 100 73 0.61 0.59 26 .561
CFMT 2 37 < 1 −3.53 −3.40 26 .002
CFMT 3 33 1 −2.33 −2.25 26 .033
Famous familiarity 31 < 1 −3.60 −3.47 26 .002
Famous context 58 1 −2.40 −2.32 26 .029
Famous naming 14 1 −2.39 −2.31 26 .029
Face evaluation Emotion recognition 88 87 1.15 1.08 16 .294
Eyes test 72 21 −0.81 −0.80 49 .425
Attractiveness 77 64 0.37 0.36 45 .720
Likability 44 < 1 −3.36 −3.29 45 .002
Visuo-spatial BRLD-A 33 1 −2.52 −2.52 173 .013
BRLD-B 38 2 −2.02 − 2.01 173 .046
LPS2-Visual 48 16 −1.00 −1.00 128 .321
CFMT: Cambridge Face Memory Test [38]; Eyes test: Reading the mind in the eyes; BRLT: Bergen Right-Left Discrimination Test [36]; LPS2-Visual: Leistungsprüfsystem 2
(“performance test system”), test of visuo-spatial skills [37]
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which one is from the learned set. This task is either
performed under normal viewing conditions (part 2) or
under conditions where faces are strongly degraded by
noise (part 3). In both of these tasks, J performed at
chance level (Fig. 2). When asked afterwards what she
found difficult, J reported that her strategy of finding
one characteristic feature for each face breaks down
once many faces need to be learned at the same time, as
no single feature is unique to each face any more.
Given this pattern of results (perfect performance on
the first part of the CFMT), we decided against adding a
dedicated face matching task like the Cambridge Face
Perception Test [7]. Instead, we tried to further narrow
down J’s problems with face memory.
Recognition of familiar faces
While remembering faces seen only on one occasion is a
difficult task per se, people with DP are also unable to
recognize individuals they have known for years [4, 23,
24, 40]. Similarly, J reported several occasions on which
she passed her husband on the street without recogniz-
ing him. On another occasion, J passed a large wall of
mirrors in a department store and, for a brief moment,
mistook her own reflection for somebody mimicking her
movements. Also, J noted that when she looks at pic-
tures of herself, e.g. taken on a vacation, she is surprised
every time she sees a picture of herself. “I cannot re-
member what I look like”, she told us.
Despite being unable to recognize her husband or her-
self, J claims that there are a number of famous people
she can recognize by their faces with high certainty.
Studies in which participants with DP were asked to
recognize famous faces have shown that they are
significantly worse than controls in these tasks. However,
their absolute scores are surprisingly high, as they usu-
ally can still identify around 30–40% of the faces cor-
rectly [16, 41]. One explanation is that those famous
faces for which there has been more exposure might be
easier to recognize [16]. However, this contradicts the
observation that most cases of DP have difficulties in
recognizing family members and themselves, despite life-
long exposure [8, 23, 40, 42].
To test J’s ability to recognize famous faces and dir-
ectly address the role of exposure, we asked her to pro-
vide us with a list of people she thinks she can recognize
from looking at their face alone. The list J provided con-
sisted of 14 celebrities, including Angela Merkel, Barack
Obama, some (but notably not all) actors from the
shows “How I Met Your Mother”, “House” and “Law
and Order”, as well as some other politicians and actors.
In our final experiment, there were 42 famous people (5
images per person), including the ones from J’s list, ac-
tors on the same shows who were not on the list, and
other famous people (cf. Table 2). All pictures were
gray-scaled and prepared so that only inner features
were visible. The task for J was to first decide if she
knew the person (familiarity) then if she could pick the
context from which the person might be familiar and fi-
nally to write down the person’s name (either the actual
name or, in the case of actors, the name of the character
they play).
J’s performance was below the normal range for famil-
iarity, context and for naming (Fig. 3, Table 1), indicating
a clear deficit in recognizing familiar faces. However, her
Fig. 2 Results of the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CFMT). J shows perfect performance when one face needed to be remembered and recognized
(1st part), but is among the slowest and most inaccurate participants when six faces had to be remembered and recognized (parts 2 and 3). Averaged
over all three parts of the CFMT, J answered 37 out of 72 items correctly (51%). On average, the control participants answered 59 items
correctly, (SD = 7), so to be within 2 SDs at least 45 hits are needed
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Table 2 Detailed results of the famous face experiment for J
Known For/As Name On List Known Number Familiar Number Names Mistakes
HIMYM Alyson Hannigan (Lily) yes yes 5 5
Jason Segel (Marshall) yes yes 4 4
Neil Patrick Harris (Barney) yes yes 4 3
Josh Radnor (Ted) no yes 0 0
Cobie Smulders (Robin) no yes 2 0 Mariska Hargitay
Cristin Milioti (Tracy) no no 1 0 Audrey Hepburn
House Robert Sean Leonard (Wilson) yes yes 5 5
Hugh Laurie (House) yes yes 4 4
Omar Epps (Eric Foreman) no yes 3 3
Lisa Edelstein (Lisa Cuddy) no yes 0 0
Law & Order Ice-T (Odafin “Fin” Tutuola) no yes 5 5
Mariska Hargitay (Liv) yes yes 3 3
Dann Florek (Donald Cragen) no yes 1 1
Big Bang Theory Jim Parsons (Sheldon Cooper) no yes 1 0 Wilson
Kaley Cuoco (Penny) no yes 0 0
Bones Emily Deschanel (“Bones”) yes yes 4 4 a Spice Girl
Musician Britney Spears no yes 3 3
Elvis Presley no yes 4 0
Beyonce no yes 0 0
Shakira no yes 0 0
Taylor Swift no no 0 0
Usher no no 0 0
Movie Actor Will Smith yes yes 5 5
Leonardo DiCaprio no yes 5 4 Brad Pitt
Tom Cruise no yes 4 4
Nicole Kidman yes yes 3 3
George Clooney no yes 1 0 Charlie Sheen
Mila Kunis no yes 0 0
Benedict Cumberbatch no no 1 0
Emma Watson no no 0 0
Politician Barack Obama yes yes 5 4
Angela Merkel yes yes 4 4
Sigmar Gabriel no yes 2 1
Sahra Wagenknecht no yes 0 0
Ursula von der Leyen no yes 0 0
Sports-person Joachim Loew no yes 5 4 Wilson
Bastian Schweinsteiger no yes 0 0
TV Host Guenther Jauch yes yes 4 4
News-anchor Katja Burkard yes yes 0 0
Caren Miosga yes yes 2 0 Kate Winslet
Jan Hofer no yes 0 0
Judith Rakers no yes 0 0
J’s responses for the part of the famous face test where only inner features are shown. “Recognizable” refers to whether J thinks that she can usually
recognize that person based on the face. “Known” refers to whether J said she knew who the person is. “Familiarity” refers to how often J reported a
feeling of familiarity with the face, out of 5 trials. “Naming” refers to the number of times J could correctly name the person (out of 5). “Mistakes” lists
any incorrect naming responses given by J. HIMYM: “How I Met Your Mother”
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performance was average or above-average when only
considering the faces on the list she prepared. Regarding
free naming, J reached only 14% correct for famous
people not on her list, but performed 69% correct for
the famous faces who were on her list. This illustrates
that J has good introspection into her abilities: there are
faces that she can recognize by their inner features alone
with high reliability. For example, J successfully recog-
nized the characters Lily (5 out of 5), Marshall (4/5) and
Barney (3/5) from the sitcom “How I Met Your Mother”,
who were all previously on her list. The other two main
protagonists Ted and Robin from the same show were
not on her list and both were not recognized even once
(both 0/5), although J should have had roughly the same
amount of exposure to them.
To get a better understanding of how J performed that
task, we later asked her to try and verbalize what makes
recognizing certain faces easy. Regarding Ms. Merkel (4/5
correct namings), J pointed out that Ms. Merkel seems to
have a “characteristic facial expression that is kind of stiff”.
Regarding Mr. Obama (4/5 correct namings), J said that
he is easy to recognize due to his “freckles”, a subtle
feature which most observers (including the authors)
probably do not notice but which prove useful for
observers who heavily rely on recognizing individuals by
single features.
Featural vs. configural processing
To better understand how J uses the features of the face
compared to their configuration (so-called holistic or
configural processing; [25]), we modified the famous
faces task to show low-pass and high-pass filtered im-
ages. When applying a low-pass filter (Fig. 4), a single
blurred feature, for example an eye, cannot be recog-
nized as such in isolation, but only in the context of the
whole face. Hence, using low-pass filtered images in
recognition tasks is useful to test the integrity of config-
ural face processing by preventing single-feature ana-
lyses. As we anticipated this task to be very difficult, we
used the full images with peripheral information. In the
task, J was relatively unimpaired, scoring 48% for
naming of the blurred images and 85% for the unaltered
images. Therefore, J’s performance is surprisingly high,
even when configural processing is allegedly the only
Fig. 3 Results for the famous faces task. Face stimuli were grey-scaled and cut out with an ellipse so that only inner features were visible. For
each face, three questions had to be answered: is the face familiar? (yes/no); from what context might that person be known? (politician, actor,
musician, athlete, TV host); what is the name of the person? Results of the control participants (con) are shown in blue. J’s results for famous faces
she did not preselect are shown in red and J’s results for faces which she previously picked as ones she thinks she can reliably recognize are
shown in green (J*). Picture of Barack Obama is in the public domain (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:President_Barack_Obama.jpg)
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viable strategy. From discussions with J, we learned that
she claims to be able to judge “the interplay of different
face parts” when confronted with blurred images. While
intact configural processing in DP has been reported be-
fore [43, 44], it raises the question of what mechanism
can explain the deficits observed in DP and why the
good performance even under adversarial conditions
does not easily translate into everyday life. When asked
about this, J claimed that one difficulty in everyday life is
that familiar faces will not pop out from a crowd. How-
ever, they often can be found with enough effort. For ex-
ample, while J might walk by her husband on the street,
she might be able to find him at a designated spot. Simi-
larly, J might scan a lecture hall row by row and seat by
seat to finally find a fellow student she is looking for.
This “one face at a time” strategy might also allow for
good performance in certain experimental settings, like
the present task.
The face’s social information
Another aspect of face processing that is usually unim-
paired in people with DP is the recognition of emotions,
intentions or other social information, such as trust-
worthiness [45, 46]. Despite her prosopagnosia, J says
she is very good at picking up subtle social cues, which
also aid her in deciding whether someone might be fa-
miliar: “I can recognize if someone recognizes me; and
then I act accordingly”. She also judges her skills to tell if
her interaction partner is lying, agitated or uncomfort-
able as very high: “I think I have a very keen understand-
ing of social signals. The way the eyes of a person change
when they are uncomfortable, small pauses they make in
their speech and certain subtle facial expressions”. In
order to objectively assess her ability to derive social cues
from faces, we used the “Reading the mind in the eyes”
test, which measures the ability to imagine the mental
states of others [47]. In the test, only the eye region of a
person’s face is shown and the participant is asked to se-
lect one word out of four which best describes the mental
state of the depicted person (for example, “ashamed”,
“alarmed”, “bewildered”, “irritated”). On the test, J scored
26 points out of 36 (72% correct), which is at the lower
end of the normal range (cf. Table 1). The only other case
of DP in the literature who performed the “Reading the
mind in the eyes” test also showed poor performance,
even significantly below the normal range [48].
To further test J’s ability to identify facial expressions
of emotion, we used a 7-way forced-choice basic expres-
sion recognition task, with happy, sad, angry, fearful, dis-
gusted, surprised and neutral faces. Here, J scored 88%
correct and was the second-best participant in our sam-
ple (Fig. 5). This is in line with most studies indicating
that individuals with DP are unimpaired in recognizing
emotions in faces [49, 50]; but see [48] for deficits in
emotion recognition).
Attractiveness and likability of faces
In addition to identifying intentions and emotions, J is
also convinced that she can reliably judge the attractive-
ness of faces, and a number of episodes from her life
seem to corroborate this impression.
In one episode, J recalled being at a discotheque with
a female friend. She saw a man she found handsome,
had a drink with him and they talked for some amount
Fig. 4 Results for the filtered famous faces. Face stimuli were all shown in grey-scale and with peripheral features visible. The “original” condition
consists of stimuli with no further manipulation; the high-pass filtered (HPF) version consists of faces which were filtered so that the edges of
features are emphasized; the low-pass filtered (LPF) version consists of faces which were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel so that features are
blurred and featural processing of faces is not possible. Each face has to be rated regarding familiarity, context and the person’s name has to be
given. Results of the control participants are shown in blue (con), J’s results for famous faces she did not preselect are shown in red and J’s
results for faces which she previously listed as being recognizable are shown in green (J*). Except for the familiarity ratings on HPF and LPF faces,
where J’s performance is 2 SD below the controls, her performance on all tasks and for both preselected and not preselected faces was within
the normal range. Picture of Barack Obama is in the public domain
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of time. The other day, she was at a café with the same
friend, as a man walked by. She remarked to her friend
that he also looks quite handsome, to which her friend re-
plied that this was the same man she had drinks with the
night before. The same thing happened a third time, only
a few days afterwards, with the same man, in pretty much
the same way. This provides anecdotal evidence that J’s
judgments of attractiveness are consistent across time.
J also reported that she likes “odd” faces and takes an
immediate liking to anyone with some idiosyncratic fea-
tures in their face. She finds people with green eyes or
thick eyebrows immediately likable, predominantly be-
cause they are easier to identify and consequently inter-
action with them is considerably less stressful. “I like red
hair a lot and take an immediate liking to anyone who
has it”, J told us. Similarly, other cases of DP described
in the literature have remarked that they focus on the
“worst features” of each acquaintance’s face to remember
them, keep company with “physically distinctive” people
and claim that forgetting someone’s face should be
regarded a compliment, because good looks are not
memorable [9].
Increasing the averageness of a face normally increases
its perceived attractiveness [53]) while making it less
distinctive. Accordingly, we prepared a task where faces
with different degrees of averageness were presented
(Fig. 6). In each trial a pair of faces was shown, one more
and one less strongly averaged, and J had to make a choice
which one she finds more attractive or more likable. Com-
pared to a group of 46 female control participants, J
showed a prototypical preference for more average faces
when it comes to attractiveness, but was the only person
in the group to find less average faces more likable. The
results show that in DP, ratings of attractiveness and lik-
ability might dissociate (Fig. 6, Fig. 7). The findings are
both in line with studies showing normal attractiveness
ratings for individuals with DP [54], as well as the until
now incompatible observation that they report liking ‘odd’
faces more.
Discussion and conclusions
We have presented the case of J, a 30-year old woman suf-
fering from DP, a lifelong face recognition deficit. J
presents with a pure form of DP, showing strongly im-
paired recognition of identity for both unfamiliar and fa-
miliar faces, but no difficulties recognizing expressions,
intentions or attractiveness from faces (cf. Table 1, Fig. 7).
She can also recognize identity from uncropped images of
faces, indicating preserved configural processing of faces
with peripheral features.
The pattern of J’s deficits lends further support to the
notion that face processing is special, in that it can be
dissociated from the processing of other objects [55],
and that recognizing identity from faces can be inde-
pendent from recognizing other aspects of the face, such
as emotion or intention [56, 57].
While DP certainly is a heterogeneous disorder [5, 44]
and it is difficult to generalize from the single case, the
CFMT provided the most unequivocal results in the
present study, as it allowed us to best delineate J’s
Fig. 5 Results of the emotion recognition task. In the task, one face was shown at a time (happy, angry, fearful, sad, disgusted, surprised or
neutral) and had to be labeled in a 7-way forced-choice decision. The figure shows the percentage of correct responses for 17 unmatched male
control participants in blue and for J in red. J scores 88% correct, making her the second-best performing participant in the sample. Control data
were taken from [51]; stimuli were taken from the NimStim database [52]
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performance from the control participants. The perfect
performance on the first part of the CFMT, where only
one face has to be learned and recognized, also suggests
that J’s difficulties cannot be due to problems with face
perception. This part of the CFMT strongly dissociated
from the other two parts, where multiple faces have to be
learned and recognized (Fig. 7). In line with the present
results, the CFMT has been successfully used to identify
DP in a number of previous studies (e.g. [38, 48]). J also
told us that she found the CFMT to reflect her problems
most faithfully, because many faces need to be learned at
once and even extreme conscientiousness did not allow
her to perform well when using only single features. A test
that has so far worked for the majority of patients in the
literature is important, especially to improve the state of
clinical diagnostics in DP [14, 15]. However, while
perfect performance on the first part of the CFMT indi-
cates that J likely has no problems with simple face
matching, most people with DP have some problems
in this part of the test [38]. Therefore, to better dif-
ferentiate between face perception and face memory
deficits when diagnosing DP, the CFMT should be
accompanied by a face matching task, like the Cam-
bridge Face Perception Test [7].
In contrast to the CFMT, the famous faces test showed
less specificity, as some of the healthy controls per-
formed very poorly on the task. This poor performance
might be due to a cursory familiarity with the respective
people (i.e., having seen one movie with an actor, as op-
posed to watching a show every week). Also, participants
Fig. 6 Results of the average faces task. The upper part of the figure shows a set of example stimuli, with the number of faces that were
averaged to create the stimulus increasing from left to right. In the task, a random pair of faces was shown in each trial and the participants had
to decide which one is more attractive (part 1) or more likable (part 2). The lower part of the figure shows the percentage of preferences for the
more average face. If the average faces are preferred, the responses will lie above 50%. If the less average faces are preferred, the responses will
lie below 50%. A response at exactly 50% will indicate absence of a systematic preference of one over the other. Responses for 46 female control
participants are shown in blue and results for J are shown in red. Stimuli were created using faceresearch.org. Stimuli are based on images from
DeBruine & Jones, available under a CC-BY licence from https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5047666.v3
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who know only a few famous people are more likely to
be outliers, as knowing 40 people and scoring all correct
or all incorrect is much less likely than knowing only 4
people and scoring all correct or incorrect. Hence, using
faces that are completely new to all participants, as is in
the CFMT, might make results more straightforward to
interpret and compare.
Regarding explanatory mechanisms for J’s deficits in
unfamiliar and familiar face recognition, we expected
that impaired configural processing might offer the best
explanation. However, the present study as well as some
previous work in the literature has found largely intact
configural processing in DP [43, 44]; but see [58] for
contrary results). As we used uncropped images of faces
including the peripheral features, one important ques-
tion is whether testing configural processing of only the
inner features of the face would have produced different
results. Given the specificity of the disorder, it is reason-
able to assume that in DP configural processing for
other information (e.g. peripheral features) might be in-
tact, and is impaired only for the inner features of the
face. Indeed, two studies which investigated more gen-
eral configural processing mechanisms found no deficits
in DP [43, 44], while studies which used only the inner
Fig. 7 Comparison of J’s performance for all major tasks. Differences in z-scores for all pairings of tasks are reported, with positive scores indicating
higher performance for the tasks listed in the rows, compared to the tasks listed in the columns. Differences larger than two standard deviations are
highlighted by stronger colors, with the given annotations indicating the numerical difference in z-scores. The emerging pattern suggests that J’s
performance is impaired for tasks involving learning of multiple faces (CFMT 2 and 3), and the recognition of famous faces from their inner parts,
compared to learning of a single face (CFMT 1) and the recognition of emotion, intention (Eyes test) and attractiveness in faces. CFMT: Cambridge
Face Memory Test; Eyes test: Reading the mind in the eyes; BRLT: Bergen Right-Left Discrimination Test; LPS2-Visual: Leistungsprüfsystem 2
(“performance test system”, test of visuo-spatial skills)
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part of faces did find individuals with DP to be impaired
[59, 60]. However, the fusiform gyrus is one potential
neural correlate of the configural processing of faces [61],
and individuals with DP have mostly shown prototypical
activity patterns [29–31]. In line with these observations, J
showed no structural or functional abnormalities in her
fusiform gyri, at least on a macroanatomical scale. There-
fore, the deficits in DP might manifest themselves higher
up the face processing stream, for example in the anterior
temporal areas responsible for matching a face to a
person’s identity [62, 63]. These areas might constitute the
neural basis for an impaired matching of novel face views
with previously learned faces [43] in DP. Recognizing pre-
viously learned faces is highly variable in DP, and previous
studies with famous faces already showed that hit rates
were higher than would be expected from individuals who
cannot recognize their parents or spouse [16, 41]. For the
first time, we showed that above-chance performance of
individuals with DP in famous face tasks is not necessarily
due to flukes or a function of familiarity. We hypothesize
that these instances of successful recognition can be due
to simple featural strategies that are not supposed to work
for identity recognition, but sometimes do work nonethe-
less. For example, J was able to recognize Mr. Obama by
using a rare but simple-to-memorize combination of local
features, like freckles on a dark complexion. Also, some-
times information from a different face-processing path-
way, for example the pathway of processing expressions
[56, 57], might be successfully exploited for identity recog-
nition. For example, J was able to recognize Ms. Merkel
by information that is not identity-related but nevertheless
stable over time, like a subtle facial expression that is
present on most pictures of her.
Given that under favorable circumstances a person
with DP can recognize faces quite well, the results raise
the question of why these abilities do not translate into
everyday life. Among the most discriminative symptoms
of DP are face recognition problems in “crowded places
or out-of context encounters” [64]. J also claims that fa-
miliar faces do not pop out from a crowd but can be
found “one face at a time”. This might indicate that tasks
which more closely emulate situations in everyday life
need to be developed. For example, the effect of using
more complex visual stimuli with distracting or mislead-
ing peripheral information could be explored. This
might allow a better understanding of the challenges in-
dividuals with DP face in their daily life.
That a better emulation of real-life experience in the
lab is possible is shown by our investigation of perceived
attractiveness and likability of faces. Here, the subjective
experience of preferring distinctive faces, and lab results
indicating typical attractiveness ratings, could be recon-
ciled. The results have shown that while a person with
DP might not have an altered sense of what makes a face
attractive, they might take a stronger liking to more dis-
tinct faces. This subtle dissociation was absent in the
non-DP persons we tested.
In summary, we present a pure case of DP, in which def-
icits are restricted to an impairment in recognizing peo-
ple’s identities from their faces. By carefully delineating
the deficit using experimental methods as well as detailed
reports of J’s subjective experience, we show that neither
lack of familiarity nor impaired configural processing in
general can explain the deficits. J’s difficulties show most
strongly when only the inner features of the face are
visible and no single feature is specific for a given face.
This suggests the conclusion that an inability specific to
integrating the inner features of the face into a whole,
might be the best explanation for the difficulties this and
other individuals with DP frequently experience.
Materials and methods
Agnosia screening
To screen for visual agnosia, we used a set of full-color
photos of 12 objects, cut-out along their contours. The im-
ages consisted of living objects such as animals, fruits or
vegetables and of non-living objects such as tools, clothes
or furniture. The screening consisted of 8 free-naming trials
where a single image was shown and had to be named, and
of four forced-choice identification trials, where an object
was named and had to be selected from a configuration of
four objects.
Structural and functional MRI
All MRI data were collected using a 3 T Siemens Trio
scanner. A high-resolution T1-weighted structural image
was acquired with 0.75 × 0.75 in-plane resolution and 0.8
slice thickness (192 sagittal slices) using a 32-channel head
coil. Task-based fMRI data were collected using a
high-resolution EPI sequence with 2x2mm in-place reso-
lution and 2mm slice thickness (40 axially oriented slices;
TR of 3 s, 12 channel head coil). Slices covered the whole
temporal lobe but omitted most of the rest of the brain.
The first 3 volumes of each fMRI run were removed to
allow for signal stabilization. Stimuli were presented using
PsychoPy2 [65] and back-projected onto a screen which
the participant viewed using a mirror mounted on the
head-coil. In the first localizer task, short movie clips with
fearful faces were shown, alternating with videos of land-
scapes. This paradigm has been used in previous studies
[66, 67]. There were 8 blocks per condition with each
block lasting 30 s (10 volumes), making a total experiment
length of eight minutes. In the second localizer task, pic-
tures and videos of faces and hands were shown in alter-
nating blocks, each block lasting 12 s, with 24 blocks per
condition, resulting in a total experiment length of 9 min,
36 s. All analyses were performed in native space using
Freesurfer 6.0 (www.freesurfer.net; [68]). Structural data
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were preprocessed using Freesurfer’s recon-all function
and fMRI data were motion-corrected and smoothed with
5mm, full-width at half maximum (FWHM). FMRI data
were analysed using Freesurfer’s FSFAST and results were
visualized using PySurfer and SurfIce.
Bergen right-left discrimination test
Body perception and mental rotation of bodies were tested
using the The Bergen Right-Left Discrimination Test
(BRLD; [36]). The test requires to identify the left and
right hand on stick figures, which is made difficult by
presenting the figures from the front or the back, and
sometimes presenting figures with their hands crossed
(BRLD-A). This is followed by a variation of the test where
all stick figures are shown upside-down (BRLD-B) [35]. A
maximum score of 144 can be reached for each part.
Normative values based on a sample of n = 174 adult par-
ticipants (124 female, mean age 28 years) were taken from
[35]. For the BRLD-A, the normative sample has a mean
score of 110 and standard deviation of 25. For the
BRLD-B, the normative sample has a mean score of 110
and standard deviation of 28.
LPS-2
Visuo-spatial abilities were tested using the visuo-spatial
tasks from the LPS-2 [37], which consist of mental rota-
tion, counting the plains of geometrical objects and
matching geometrical forms. A summary score for visual-
spatial intelligence can then be computed, with the highest
reachable score being 120. Normative values based on a
sample of n = 129 adults, with mean 76 and standard devi-
ation 18 were taken from the test manual [37].
Cambridge face memory test
To evaluate the memory for unfamiliar faces, we used
the CFMT. The test consists of three parts, (i) learning
one face, (ii) learning six faces (iii) learning six faces de-
graded by noise [38]. The control sample consisted of 27
female participants (mean age 27, range 25–35) who
were students at Bielefeld University and did not report
any history of psychiatric or neurological disorders.
These participants also served as controls for the famous
face tasks, which are described below. The experiment
was programmed and presented using PsychoPy2.
Famous faces task
To evaluate the recognition of known faces, we used an
in-house constructed famous faces test. We asked J to
provide us with a list of celebrities she thinks she can re-
liably recognize when she sees them on television or in
newspapers, of which she could name 14 (cf. Table 2).
28 other famous people were added, roughly matched in
terms of gender, occupation and ethnicity to the list of J.
Critically, we also selected people that we knew J should
be familiar with, but failed to put on her list: For ex-
ample, she named the characters of Barney, Marshall
and Lily from the Sitcom “How I Met Your Mother” on
her list, which led us to include the other protagonists,
Robin and Ted, as well. In addition to the famous
people, eight images of non-famous people were in-
cluded to control for response tendencies. We selected
five pictures per person, which were converted to
grey-scale and cropped with an ellipse so that only inner
features of the face were showing.
For each face, three consecutive questions had to be
answered: 1. “Is the person familiar to me?”; 2. “What is
the person’s occupation?”; 3. “What is the person’s name?”.
When evaluating the name, we counted real and character
names as correct. After the experiment was over, each par-
ticipant was debriefed by showing each famous person’s
picture in color and with peripheral features, with name
and occupation stated below the image. For example, a
full-color uncropped image of Leonardo DiCaprio was
shown, accompanied by the following information: “Leo-
nardo DiCaprio, Actor, Django Unchained, The Great
Gatsby, Titanic”. Hence, if given a full image and name
and occupation a participant still claimed to not know the
person, her respective answers for the main experiment
were discarded from the analyses. The experiment was
programmed and presented using PsychoPy2.
Filtered faces task
A test aimed to distinguish between featural and config-
ural processing of faces was constructed by adapting the
famous faces test with the use of spatial filters. If a face
is low-pass filtered, the resulting smoothed image lacks
the details needed for a featural processing strategy and
instead the face needs to be recognized by the arrange-
ment of the features (configural processing). The use of
spatial filters to induce featural and configural process-
ing strategies for faces has been demonstrated before
[69]. In the present experiment, each image was either
shown in grey-scale without filtering, high-pass filtered
(leaving only the high frequencies of an image, i.e., the
edges) or low-pass filtered (leaving only the low frequen-
cies of an image, i.e., smoothing). In contrast to the fam-
ous face experiment, here also peripheral features of the
face were shown. As the experiment consisted of three
parts (one for each filter type), only 24 famous faces
were used to keep the length of the experiment comfort-
able for the participants. The single parts of the experi-
ment were shown in a blocked fashion with the fixed
sequence: low-pass, high-pass, and no filter. The experi-
ment was programmed and presented using PsychoPy2.
Reading the mind in the eyes test
In the test, participants see the eye region of a single
face and have to select one of four terms that best
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describes the mental state expressed by that face. A total
score of 36 can be reached. To compute percentile
scores, we used a normative sample of 50 female student
controls from a previous study [47]. This group has a
mean score of 28.6 and standard deviation of 3.2.
Emotion expression task
To test participants’ performance in recognizing facial
expressions we used a 7-way forced-choice decision task
with happy, sad, angry, fearful, disgusted, surprised and
neutral faces. The face stimuli were taken from the Nim-
Stim database [52] and each emotion was displayed by a
total of 12 different actors. In the experiment, a single
face was shown for up to four seconds, and the partici-
pants were asked to choose which of the seven possible
emotion expressions it depicts. The control sample con-
sists of 17 males (mean age 43, range 24–58), hence con-
trols are not matched regarding gender. The paradigm
and the control group for this task are described in a
previous publication [51]. The experiment was pro-
grammed and presented using PsychoPy2.
Attractiveness and likability ratings
To investigate the judgment of attractiveness and likability
of faces depending on their averageness, we used an
in-house generated task, using faces from faceresearch.org
[70]. Face stimuli were generated as follows: First, two
random faces (of the same gender) were selected and aver-
aged together. Then, subsequently more and more faces
were added to the average in steps of two, so that there
was an image with two, four, six, eight and ten averaged
faces. Each subsequent average contained the faces from
the previous set, plus two. In this fashion, eight female
and eight male-based series of averages were constructed.
All images were then cropped with an ellipse to contain
only inner features.
The experimental setup was as follows: Two faces
from the same average sequence were presented
side-by-side (i.e., average with two and average with four
faces) and the participant was asked to judge which face
looks more attractive (or, in a separate block, more lik-
able). This was repeated for every combination of pairs
and all 16 identities, giving rise to 160 trials per block.
Whether the experiment started with the attractiveness
or the likability decisions was randomized. 46 female
controls (mean age 25 years, range 17–49) were used as
a control group and tested online using a browser-based
presentation tool.
Statistical methods
For each test, the percent of correct responses was com-
puted as the ratio of J’s score relative to the maximal
achievable score. J’s z-score for each test was computed
based on the control sample’s distribution of scores,
which was transformed to have zero mean and unit vari-
ance. The z-scores were converted into percentile scores
using a cumulative distribution function. Inferential statis-
tics were computed using the t-test method developed by
Crawford and Howell, as described in [71]. Two-sided
p-values were computed based on the t-value and the n-1
degrees of freedom (n being the size of the control sam-
ple). All computations were implemented using in-house
software written in Python 2.7. A heatmap visualizing the
differences of J’s z-scores in all major tasks was created
using Seaborn (seaborn.pydata.org).
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